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THE GLITTERING EYE OF LAW 
Geoffrey P. Miller* 
THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN. By Joseph Vining. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1986. Pp. xix, 261. $25. 
It is too soon to speak of a "Michigan School" of legal analysis. 
Academic schools announce their emergence with the founding of 
house journals, the canonization of texts, the establishment of posi-
tions on law faculties. None of that has happened in the case of the 
viewpoint most notably represented by James Boyd White and Joseph 
Vining of the University of Michigan Law School. 
Yet the approach of White, Vining, and others is gathering mo-
mentum. Its most distinctive feature is a tenacious insistence that 
texts matter in legal analysis. The primacy of texts implies that law is 
and should be deeply concerned with problems of interpretation and 
meaning. Law's sister disciplines, accordingly, are not economics, so-
ciology, politics, or any other social science, but the humanities, and 
particularly fields such as literature and theology that have long been 
organized around issues of textual interpretation. Law, according to 
these scholars, is better equipped than other hermeneutic disciplines to 
revitalize the problem of meaning for a modem age. Because it is in-
dispensable, law has never lost credibility under the onslaught of the 
scientific method. Moreover, the legal imagination has always under-
stood that cases are alloys of fact and value irrevocably fused in the 
furnace of litigation. The law, accordingly, has never fallen victim to 
the splitting of fact and value that underlies the scientific world view. 
The life of the law has not been experience: it has been the infusion of 
value and meaning into the world. The law's central value is that peo-
ple should be treated as ends in themselves, not merely as means. 1 
Professor Vining's new book, The Authoritative and the Authorita-
rian, is a powerful exposition and defense of this approach. Difficult 
and profound, idiosyncratic and exasperating, the book is an impor-
tant contribution to modem American jurisprudence. Its subject is a 
guiding question of legal philosophy: the difference between the au-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. - Ed. The John M. Olin 
Foundation provided financial support for this project. I would like to thank Douglas G. Baird, 
Michael Perry, Carol Rose, Geoffrey R. Stone, and especially Cass R. Sunstein for helpful com· 
ments and Catherine Torgerson for valuable research assistance. 
1. For James Boyd White's most significant contribution to this literature, see J.B. WHITE, 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984). Vining's earlier work in this genre is J. VINING, 
LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). Scholars doing related work include Paul Brest, Robert Burt, Robert 
Cover, Owen Fiss, Michael Perry, and Cass Sunstein. 
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thoritative - a command that is legitimate and willingly obeyed -
and the authoritarian - an order backed by threats. Vining touches 
matters as diverse as the increasing importance of law clerks in the 
work of the Supreme Court; the nature and value of hierarchy; the 
significance of time in legal method; the possibilities for freedom and 
authenticity in law and life; the relationship between faith and author-
ity; and the reality of legal persons such as corporations or courts. It 
would be a disservice to Vining to represent in a headline or short 
sentence his conclusions about the nature of authority. But if he were 
forced to summarize, he might say something like this: a text is au-
thoritative, rather than merely authoritarian, if it is a sincere expres-
sion of the mind of the speaker and if it finds acceptance in the mind of 
the hearer as reflecting who the hearer really is. 
Part I of this review sets forth Vining's approach and places it in 
the context of other legal theories. Part II discusses possible objec-
tions to the book's picture of legitimate authority. Finally, Part III 
briefly addresses the problem of self-authentication as a way of high-
lighting Vining's contention that the meaning of a text is to be assessed 
in terms of the relationship between the mind of the speaker and the 
content of the thing spoken. 
I. THE BOOK 
The Authoritative and the Authoritarian is more of an extended 
meditation than a rigorous argument. One searches in vain for hard-
edged, clearly defined concepts or rigorous deductive reasoning. 
There are many concepts, to be sure, but they flow together without 
sharp distinction.2 Each concept reflects a different facet of the same 
reality, just as the lawyer's experience of the world has different as-
pects, but "in the end it is one experience" (p. 5). There is argument 
here also, although Vining regrets its necessity (p. 5). But the book is 
not structured around a rigid conceptual skeleton. Vining describes it 
as a "walk through the problem oflegal authority" (p. 196), a butterfly 
hunt in a great forest of oaks (p. 14). 
What take the place of logic and argument are metaphor and sym-
bol. The book is organized around a set of symbolic and metaphorical 
polarities. It presents us with a stark choice between two worlds: the 
world of the authoritative, a world of sanity, community, commit-
ment, obedience, enchantment, trust, attention, seriousness, caring, 
authenticity, substance, freedom, life, activity, delight, humanity, 
faith, friendship, meaning, and law; and the world of the authorita-
rian, a world of madness, solitude, detachment, resistance, disillusion-
ment, distrust, overlooking, mockery, indifference, strategy, process, 
bondage, death, passivity, pain, nature, doubt, enmity, meaningless-
2. Vining would probably agree with this characterization. See, e.g., pp. 167-68. 
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ness, and power. Vining calls on us, as lawyers and as human beings, 
· to opt for the authoritative and reject the authoritarian. Doing so may 
mitigate the lawyer's dilemma, which is the pain of searching for 
meaning yet professing to be able to do without it (pp. 3-4). 
A. TheModel 
At the core of this book is a theory of meaning in legal texts that 
stands in contrast to the leading twentieth-century philosophical ap-
proaches to meaning. One theory of meaning, associated with the 
early Wittgenstein3 and A.J. Ayer,4 views the meaningfulness of a 
proposition as depending on its verifiability. Meaning is, in some 
sense, a correspondence between a proposition and an object. The 
meaning of a word is the object to which it refers; and if the word does 
not refer to an object, then it is literally meaningless. The other theory 
of meaning, associated most prominently with the later Wittgenstein,5 
views the meaning of a word as its use in the language. Meaning is a 
phenomenon of culture, not a matter of individual choice. Indeed, in 
some sense a private language that did not depend on others for its 
meaning would be an impossibility.6 
Vining's view of meaning has points of similarity and contrast with 
both of these theories. For Vining, a word, at least in legal analysis, 
has meaning if it is a truthful representation of the mind of the 
speaker. To say anything meaningful one must mean what one says 
(pp. 42-46). This is a correspondence theory of meaning, but the rele-
vant correspondence is not between the word and the world, but be-
tween the word and a mind. This is also a social theory of meaning, in 
the sense that to be meaningful a word must open up the mind of the 
speaker and make it capable of being understood by others. But, un-
like the later Wittgenstein, Vining insists that people and institutions 
have a degree of power over their language and are not in bondage to 
the meanings supplied by history or culture (pp. 89-100). 
According to Vining, when lawyers analyze a legal text they search 
for its meaning in exactly this sense. They presuppose the existence of 
a mind that means what is said (p. 10). The presupposition of mind 
imposes constraints on interpretation. A text, as the product of a 
mind, should be thought of, at least initially, as internally consistent. 
Internal inconsistency in a mind is an abnormal state, a form of mad-
ness or schizophrenia (p. 79). Thus techniques of analysis are devel-
oped to "save" texts from self-contradiction by categorizing, by 
declaring some things important, some unimportant, and so on (pp. 
32-33). Such saving techniques dominate the standard forms of doc-
3. L. WITIGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS Lomco-PHILOSOPHICUS (1961). 
4. A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1952). 
5. L. WITIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958), 
6. See id. at §§ 246-78. 
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trinal analysis of judicial opinions (pp. 36-37). Moreover, texts uttered 
by the same mind at different times should be consistent. Hence the 
impulse in legal analysis to transcend time, to view the "Court" of 
Marbury v. Madison7 as the same mind as the Court of today, so that 
what is said today should be consistent with what the Court said in 
1803.8 The doctrine of precedent, Vining might say, presupposes a 
unifying mind behind the opinions of a court. 
If a text is sincerely meant by the speak.er - if it accurately corre-
sponds to an organizing mind - then it is worthy of our attention. 
Indeed, texts with this kind of authenticity in some sense command us 
to pay attention. They hold us with the same "glittefiD;g eye" that the 
Ancient Mariner fixed upon the wedding guest.9 Such texts are to be 
taken seriously, respected (p. 42). 
On the other hand, some texts may tum out not to be sincerely 
meant by a speaker after all. Our interpretive labors may be insuffi-
cient to save a text from incoherence (pp. 37-38). A text may be ma-
nipulative, strategic, so that the speaker does not actually mean what 
he or she says, but merely hopes to get something out of the hearer (p. 
18). Or a text may not be the product of the speaker's mind at all, but 
rather the artifact of some other, undisclosed mind, or even of some 
impersonal process (pp. 15, 19, 24-26, 47-48, 128-31). In all these 
cases we would conclude that nothing was actually said, that the 
words we were hearing were just meaningless sounds. 10 In the context 
of appellate review of judicial or administrative decisions, the natural 
response to this kind of text is to "vacate," to treat the statement as a 
nullity because it does not disclose the presence of a mind (pp. 50, 165-
67). 
Of particular concern to Vining is the phenomenon of bureaucratic 
speech. When a government agency makes a decision it often issues an 
explanatory memorandum that appears as the official opinion of the 
agency even though it is drafted by low-level functionaries. Such texts 
are not meaningful; they "offer no access to the workings of a mind" 
(p. 12). Vining explores this problem through the conceit of supposing 
that the opinions of the Supreme Court became as bureaucratized as 
those of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This thought experi-
ment is not completely fanciful. Already, Vining notes, the Court is 
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
8. Pp. 9-10. Vining observes that Supreme Court opinions often refer to decisions of "this 
Court" even if the makeup of the Court at the time of the earlier decision was entirely different. 
P. 9. Of interest in this connection is the policy of some Justices to use the word "we" to refer to 
the Court only for decisions rendered after the Justice's appointment; prior decisions are referred 
to as decisions of "the Court." 
9. P. 14. This striking image is developed throughout the book as the symbol of legitimate 
authority. See, e.g., pp. 75, 159, 168, 186. 
10. Vining's discussion here resembles in some respects Jiirgen Habermas' distinction be-
tween "lifeworld" and "system." See 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AC-
TION 13 (1984); McCarthy, Translator's introduction to id. at xxiii. 
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evolving towards a more hierarchical organization, with numerous law 
clerks and even levels of responsibility among clerks (pp. 10-11). The 
lamentable result, according to Vining, has been a general loss of pres-
tige and authoritativeness of Supreme Court opinions. Continue the 
trend and the Court's opinions will cease to be authoritative at all and 
will instead become orders to be worked around, resisted, and treated 
strategically, rather than being willingly obeyed. 
The link between meaning and authority is authenticity (pp. 41-
59). An authentic text is one in which the author "mean[s] what he 
says" (p. 42). Thus one must not be deliberately deceptive, ambigu-
ous, or imitative (p. 42). Only texts that are authentic deserve to be 
taken seriously (p. 46) or paid attention to (pp. 57-58, 231). Vining's 
concern with authenticity has philosophical resonances. 11 His objec-
tion to inauthentic statements, for example, is Kantian in tone. Such 
statements, he says, are "manipulative, treating you as a thing" (p. 46) 
- i.e., as a means and not an end. 12 And w}J.ile Vining might not go 
so far as Kant in saying that one may not deceive even the murderer at 
the door who asks whether the master is in, 13 his stern injunction 
against insincerity is probably stricter than the approach advocated by 
many moral philosophers.14 If Vining's stand against lying resembles 
Kant, his concern with authenticity recalls twentieth-century existen-
tial philosophers, particularly Heidegger and Sartre. 15 At one point 
Vining gives an almost clinical description of anxiety16 followed by a 
transition to a state of care17 that parallels rather remarkably the dis-
cussions of the same subjects in Heidegger's Being and Time. 18 
An authentic statement, for Vining, is one that deserves our atten-
tion (pp. 57-58, 231). But whether the listener pays attention to the 
speaker, and whether the speaker has authority for the listener, are the 
same thing (p. 58). Thus the notion of authority is expressly con-
nected to attention and authenticity. Vining's remarks on the impor-
11. For modern philosophical work explicitly concerned with problems of authority, see AU-
THORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (R.B. Harris ed. 1976); E.D. WATI, AUTHORITY 
(1982); Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1985). 
12. Cj I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL Pfll· 
LOSOPHY (1949). 
13. See I. KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie From Altruistic Motives, in id. at 346; I. KANT, 
The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, in ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY (1983). 
14. Compares. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). For a 
modern Kantian's attempt to reconcile Kant's prescription against lying with the exigencies of an 
imperfect world, see Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
(forthcoming). 
15. M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1962); J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 
(1966). 
16. "[A] form of self-consciousness that can afflict an individual, a pulling back and observ-
ing of oneself in action, which can be destructive to the point of madness." P. 186. 
17. "[T]o say what [one] believes and commit [one]self to it, to act with responsibility for 
pain and harm, vulnerable, affected by the consequences of what [one] does." P. 186. 
18. M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 15, at ~ 40 (anxiety), ~~ 41-42 (care). 
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tance of attention in the establishment of legitimate authority are 
insightful and convincing.19 
Vining's account, up to this point, offers no explanation for the fact 
that certain statements seem to have special authority by virtue of 
their being made on behalf of an institution with a recognized role in a 
hierarchical organization. Part II of the book addresses the problems 
of hierarchy for an account of legitimate authority. The author ex-
plores this issue through a second conceit concerning the Supreme 
Court - supposing, not that the Court has become a bureaucracy, but 
that the Court has been eliminated altogether. For Vining this is a 
natural extension of the first thought experiment, since the eventual 
consequence of bureaucratization, in his view, is to eliminate the 
speaker as a voice that need be listened to, and therefore effectively to 
make it disappear from consciousness (p. 11 ). 
Vining's guiding image here is the pyramid, the ultimate symbol of 
hierarchy and raw political force (e.g., p. 63). For Vining, hierarchy 
itself has no special claim to authority; to the contrary, the distance 
between above and below implied by hierarchy is inconsistent with the 
candor between speaker and listener presupposed by the legal method 
(p. 76). Yet a pyramid, when turned on its side, resembles a focus, 
with the apex, once the highest point, now the center (p. 100). Vining 
literally turns the image on its side. He proposes that the authority 
that seems to flow from hierarchy is more accurately seen as deriving 
from a center for attention and action (p. 77). A center provides con-
sistency, thus enhancing the concentration of attention necessary for 
the firm establishment of authority (p. 80). Perhaps more importantly, 
a center provides a focal point from which it is possible to work on 
language (p. 86). An individual has little control over his or her lan-
guage, because language itself is a social phenomenon: "[W]e are all 
helpless before our language, which comes to us, together with its 
structure, organizing concepts, and categories, in organized form ... " 
(p. 90). A center, however, provides the kind of organization that is 
needed if we are to have an effect on the language. Thus the Supreme 
Court, when it decides cases, has the power to change meanings of 
words (pp. 82-85) and may even modify the "structure of thought" 
embedded in language.20 The presence of a center facilitates greater 
self-determination through the operation on language of a unifying, 
freely-choosing mind.21 
19. E.g., pp. 77-80. Vining's concern with attention perhaps reflects the influence of Max 
Weber's account of charismatic authority. See M. WEBER, The Nature of Charismatic Authority 
and its Routinization, in ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 48 (S. Eisenstadt ed. 
1968). 
20. Pp. 96-100. By "structure of thought" Vining apparently means pervasive concepts such 
as the entity theory of the corporation in corporate law. 
21. Vining's comments surely overstate the Supreme Court's power to affect the growth and 
development of the language. One is reminded of the notorious inefficacy of the French Acad-
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Where, then, is the authoritative to be found? For Vining, the au-
thoritative depends on the assent of the person who is asked to obey 
(pp. 146-47). The proposition that legitimate political authority rests 
on the consent of the governed is anything but new. Vining's original 
contribution is to derive that assent, not from some real or hypotheti-
cal original contract, or from some form of democratic procedure, but 
rather from a theory of meaning and authenticity. The assent that 
establishes authority "rests upon perception of a mind and a person in 
place of [some impersonal] system" (p. 147). 
The mechanism by which assent is called forth is the direct com-
munication from mind to mind through the medium of an authentic 
text (p. 185). The authoritative "mak[es] values come alive" (p. 179) 
for both the speaker and the hearer. The hearer who accepts a state-
ment as authoritative does so by internalizing it, so that "the ends that 
animate the speaker come to animate the listener and to be his own, 
[and] the two are pulled together" (p. 185). The statement comes to 
be experienced by the listener, not as "outside," as the imposition of a 
force to be resisted- an order backed by threats - but as "inside," as 
something that the listener willingly obeys because the voice speaking 
has become, in a sense, the hearer's own (pp. 179-84). Legitimate au-
thority is obedience to one's self. The self that one obeys, however, 
becomes authentic and real only through its relationships with others: 
[I]t may be true that one cannot find oneself without finding [others], feel 
substance oneself without seeing their substance, love oneself without 
loving them. It may be that one cannot find the authoritative for oneself 
without also freeing others to will and to act. It may be that one can find 
the authoritative only by ceasing to look down, that one finds meaning 
only by looking directly into another's eyes. [p. 186]22 
B. The Theory in Context 
Vining's theory of meaning has strong methodological implica-
tions, for it leads to a sustained and often slashing critique of most of 
the leading analytical techniques and legal schools of the twentieth 
century. 
At the most abstract level Vining's attack is directed at a family of 
methodological presuppositions associated with the philosophy of pos-
itivism in social theory. These presuppositions include nominalism -
the proposition that there are no real entities or universals beyond the 
emy's attempt to dictate "proper" usage. If it is all but impossible to stop the development of 
language in its tracks, it is surely almost equally difficult to move it forward in any particular 
direction by an act of will. At most, the Supreme Court is likely to affect the meaning of specifl· 
cally legal words; but if this is the limit of its effectiveness the Court hardly does much to ad· 
vance our sense of autonomy in the face of an impersonal and socially given language. 
22. Cf McCarthy, Translator's introduction to J. HABERMAS, supra note 10, at xxi 
("Habermas is after a notion of ego identity that centers around the ability to realize oneself 
under conditions of communicatively shared intersubjectivity.") (emphasis in original). 
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individual; rationalism - the belief that reality can be captured with 
the methods of mathematical logic; and individualism - the general 
orientation in political and ethical philosophy of allowing individuals 
to make their own decisions for good or ill (pp. 105-06). For Vining, 
each of these assumptions, and the overall philosophy of positivism 
they implement, are profoundly misguided as applied to legal analy-
sis. 23 Rationalism presents a vision of "drift and meaninglessness," 
able to mark out only a tiny island of clarity in an infinite sea of the 
unknown, and justified even by its proponents only on the pragmatic 
ground that it serves as a stimulus to action (p. 106). Individualism 
may have some value in combating paternalism; but it has "never 
reached the heart of the law" (p. 106). Nominalism too is foreign to 
legal analysis, since the law "never rejected entities beyond the indi-
vidual" (p. 106). 
Vining would replace these misguided principles with ones better 
suited for the task of legal study. For nominalism he would substitute 
personification, the construction in legal analysis of artificial persons 
such as corporations or courts.24 For individualism he would substi-
tute individuality, the recognition that although each person is unique 
we share "an alikeness of spirit" (p. 107). For rationalism he would 
substitute something he might call constructivism, a unifying ap-
proach that does not insist on breaking the universe into abstractions 
and then relating them according to the rules of formal logic. Vining's 
discussion of these matters is occasionally trite. Our uniqueness, he 
says, "seems to be equaled in the uniqueness of snowflakes. But the 
fact is presumably not troubling to a snowflake" (p. 106). And a few 
pages later he asks, "Does not life in the face of death suggest who we 
are, and does not who we are explain life going on in the face of death" 
(p. 149)? 
· Vining's attack is particularly pointed when it comes to schools of 
legal analysis. Justice Holmes' early view that "prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact ... are what I mean by the law"25 is mocked as a 
"bad boy's" philosophy that "appeals to the juvenile and the fearful 
side of ourselves" (p. 39). Equally biting are Vining's comments on 
the legal realist movement, which he pillories as a "breakfast theory of 
justice" for saying that what a judge does is determined by the break-
fast he or she eats in the morning: 
When at the end of one's search for law one finds oneself deposited in a 
small white room staring at a fried egg, one has the choice of giving up 
the enterprise, for one really has nothing useful or interesting to say and 
23. Vining's attack on positivism is part of a growing antipositivist movement in the social 
sciences. See generally the authorities cited in w. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETO-
RIC OF AssENT 207 app. (1974). 
24. E.g .• pp. 106, 149, 198. 
25. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
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no one to say it to; or one can come out of the room and creep back to 
one's fellows. [p. 18] 
Vining is somewhat kinder on a personal level, but no less opposed 
intellectually, to theorists who view law as the outcome of institutional 
processes. Presumably - Vining does not say - he has in mind the 
approach advocated by Hart and Sacks in their famous unpublished 
"Legal Process" materials.26 Also perhaps included within this cri-
tique are contemporary theorists such as John Hart Ely.27 Process 
theories suffer from the same underlying defect as legal realism: by 
viewing the law as some sort of system, some impersonal process (p. 
19), they leave the active, organizing mind out of their picture of the 
law. 
Especially vehement is Vining's critique of the application of scien-
tific methods to the law. Although such methods have an appropriate 
place in law practice (p. 19), it is an error of profound dimensions to 
assume that science can capture what law is really about.28 Law is a 
discipline concerned with meaning, with analyzing texts to determine 
the structure of the mind behind them. But the application of scien-
tific methods to law - what Vining sometimes calls "sociological ju-
risprudence" - utterly fails to take account of mind. It replaces the 
question of meaning - what did the speaker really mean by these 
words? - with one of causality - what caused the speaker to utter 
them (p. 18)? Here we have left the realm of the authoritative and 
entered that of the authoritarian. A theory oflaw that seeks to explain 
everything in terms of cause and effect, and thereby excludes mind 
from the analysis, partakes of nature, not of man; it discloses only laws 
of nature, which "are nothing to be obeyed or respected" (p. 21). 
Vining doesn't condescend to mention the two most significant 
modem jurisprudential schools - the law and economics and critical 
legal studies movements. It is not difficult, however, to extend the 
trajectory of his views to these theories. Law and economics, Vining 
would say, is simply a new form of legal science, a fried egg made even 
more unpalatable because it has been allowed to cool for a time and 
then reheated. Law and economics views judicial decisions not as the 
product of an organizing mind but as the consequence of various 
outside pressures. Its obsession with precision and calculation leads it 
to "replac[e] the individual with an integer," to insist on using tools 
that are "not appropriate to the task of . . . experience" (p. 106). Its 
analytic technique is infected by a "false marginalism" (pp. 182-87) 
that, by focusing on decisions made at the margin, renders opaque the 
reality of what the decision is all about. Law and economics commits 
26. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process (1958) (unpublished). 
27. See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW {1980). 
28. For a related attack on the presuppositions of economic science, see D. MCCLOSKEY, 
THE RHETORIC OF EcONOMICS (1985). 
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the sin (to Vining) of looking for "venality, duplicity, ... [and] ambi-
tion" (p. 34) in the material it analyzes. And law and economics, like 
neoclassical economics generally, falls into error when it accepts as 
given the preferences revealed by individuals in their behavior. Law 
and economics therefore provides us with "no way of thinking that 
will order our wants" (p. 4). It ignores the fact that people, as autono-
mous, self-defining individuals, have a choice to make about their pref-
erences (pp. 94-96). Law and economics is, accordingly, incapable of 
grasping or understanding what is authoritative in law. 
Critical legal studies, for its part, would no doubt come in for equal 
condemnation. CLS in some respects is concerned with themes that 
Vining also stresses: authenticity, alienation, community, the impor-
tance of doctrine. But CLS views existing legal doctrines as mystifica-
tions, smokescreens to cover insidious motives such as class or racial 
bias, desire to establish and maintain regimes of hierarchy and domi-
nance, and the like. 29 Such an approach is directly contrary to Vin-
ing's insistence that the legal analyst assume the good will of the 
speaker. Vining, unlike his contemporaries in the CLS movement, be-
lieves in the possibilities of law, its traditional methods, and its auton-
omy. Moreover, some CLS theorists, notably Duncan Kennedy, have 
endorsed deliberately strategic and even deceptive techniques in the 
pursuit of their political objectives. 30 Such mendacious behavior is 
rankest heresy for Vining. If Holmes is a "bad boy" for his somewhat 
cynical views, Kennedy and his cohorts must be very, very bad boys. 
All of these schools - legal realism, process theories, sociological 
jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical legal studies - are re-
jected for essentially the same reason: they are concerned with doing, 
not with saying (pp. 39-40); with cause and effect, not with an autono-
mous mind. But with so many points of view excluded, what ap-
proach to legal analysis qualifies for inclusion within Vining's charmed 
circle? Vining approves of doctrinal analysis of the type lawyers and 
law professors have been doing since time immemorial: analysis that 
seeks to place the text in context (p. 32), to reconcile it with other texts 
by the same speaker (p. 32), to connect past and present by giving 
meaning to texts written in an earlier day (pp. 31-32), and to assume, 
at least until the contrary is established, that behind the text is a unify-
ing mind ("the Court") speaking with sincerity and authenticity (pp. 
34-35). 
This type of legal analysis, says Vining, finds its true intellectual 
home within the family of the liberal arts, not the sciences. The 
"cousin disciplines" of law (p. 28) are those concerned with textual 
29. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 
205 (1979). 
30. E.g., Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Kennedy, First 
Year Law Teaching as Political Action, I LAW & Soc. PROBS. 47 (1981). 
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analysis: cultural history, literary criticism, 'Certain kinds of philoso-
phy (p. 28), creative writing (pp. 29-30), and art criticism (p. 41). Sur-
passing all of these as the law's closest living relative is modem 
theology. Vining professes some diffidence about proposing this anal-
ogy, on the ground that theology has become alien to the modem sen-
sibility (p. 187). But he finds the similarities between theology and law 
to be compelling: lawyers are bound by custom to pay obeisance to 
robed :figures of authority; to address them with ancient titles ("your 
honor"); to engage in elaborate supplications known as "pleadings" in 
which they "pray" for relief; to rely on the authority of the ages; and 
to adopt an attitude of faith towards the statements of the courts (pp. 
188-90). Even the methodological evils are similar: both law and the-
ology are plagued by the problems of legalism (treating texts as exter-
nal objects of manipulation rather than internalized authorities) (pp. 
196-97) and idolatry (confusing the signifier with the signified.)31 To 
those who find the analogy between law and theology somewhat 
strained, Vining's response might be: to him who has ears to hear, let 
him hear.32 
C. The Book as Exemplar 
The Authoritative and the Authoritarian speaks of meaning and au-
thority in texts, and is itself a text that purports to be authoritative. 
Accordingly, the book presents complex issues of self-reference. If it is 
to be taken seriously it must in some sense stand as an exemplar of its 
own method. Otherwise it is contradictory and incoherent. By exam-
ining the book as a self-application of its own prescriptions, it may be 
possible both to understand those prescriptions better and to place in 
context some of the more unusual features of Vining's approach. 
One might expect that a book about interpretation and authorita-
tiveness would itself interpret and cite to other works. But Vining in-
sists on being an oracle rather than an interpreter. He does not rely on 
the authority of others. 33 The authentication that Vining claims for 
his book is self-authentication, not some endorsement from without. 
The task of self-authentication is the implicit project of the book. 
If the work is to be authoritative according to its own terms, it must be 
the authentic product of a guiding mind, and it must evoke willing 
assent in its audience. Thus Vining starts by providing every possible 
evidence that there is a single mind underlying his text. The thematic 
31. Pp. 198-99; cf pp. 45-46, discussing the sin of the Hebrews in worshipping the golden 
calf. 
32. Cf Matthew 13:43. For another jurisprudential work ending on a theological note, see 
Roberto Unger's inspirational KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 290-95 (1981). 
33. Vining's failure to situate his theory within the pre-existing intellectual landscape can be 
quite frustrating to those who, like the present reviewer, have tried to understand his views 
within the broader context of existing intellectual trends. 
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metaphors and organizing symbols that pervade the book give it a 
kind of literary coherence that would be lacking in any text drafted by 
a committee or farmed out to a research assistant. Moreover, the book 
is quirky and idiosyncratic in any number of respects, from the unu-
sual (for legal texts) chapter headings ("Time," "Illusion," "Mind," 
etc.), to the strange system of footnotes (which Vining calls "amplifi-
cations"), to the bad poems that open and close the narrative. In 
many respects this book is an editor's nightmare; but there is no doubt 
that Vining stands behind it as the author. Nor is there any doubt that 
he means what he says. The book drips sincerity even to the point of 
sacrificing humor.34 Thus at least the initial conditions for authority, 
as Vining defines them, are fully satisfied: the book is the product of a 
guiding mind that sincerely means what it says. 
The book is equally self-consistent in its move from authenticity to 
authority. Vining's task is to evoke an attitude of willing, uncoerced 
assent in his reader. Consistent with this project, Vining does not en-
gage in much argument in the traditional sense. For Vining, argument 
is distasteful because it carries the implication of wishing to coerce the 
assent of the reader in the context' of an adversarial debate. We can 
expect, therefore, that in place of argument Vining will appeal to the 
readers' own experiences and values. This is exactly his method. He 
asks the reader to "search yourself" (p. 46), to draw on "personal 
experience" (p. 46), to consider the things that "everybody knows" (p. 
178). The method is not a rationalist method, for Vining does not ask 
the reader to accept a system of postulates or restrictive assumptions 
and then to follow a chain of deductive reasoning. Vining appeals to 
the caring, wanting, hoping, desiring sides of people as well as to their 
rational capacities. While his reluctance to take on an argument is 
self-consistent, it weakens the persuasive impact of his theory. In the 
absence of argument, Vining's approach is likely to appeal primarily to 
people who were inclined to accept its premises in the first place. Vin-
ing might reply, with some merit, that argument of the traditional 
form rarely changes people's minds, because people will tend to credit 
the arguments that they were inclined to believe in the first place. 
Even so, Vining sacrifices some of the benefit that an argument gives 
to the uncommitted reader who wishes to work through the pros and 
cons of a position and arrive at his or her own independent view on the 
subject. 
We might also expect that Vining's claim to authority will not 
make a rigid distinction between fact and value. Vining's theory does 
not split into normative and descriptive elements. It is all normative 
and all descriptive. Its concepts are value-charged. The attributes of 
the authoritative - seriousness, trust, caring, enchantment, and so on 
34. Vining approves of texts that are to be taken "seriously" and denigrates those that induce 
"laughter," "joke[s]," "smile[s]," and like reactions. See, e.g., pp. 41, 42, 54, 55. 
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- are good things, while the "fearful opposites" (p. 23) that pertain to 
the authoritarian are equally bad. Vining's style may be offputting to 
those schooled in the ostensibly value-neutral rhetoric of academic 
legal analysis. 
Finally, we might expect that the book would show the kind of 
"internalization" that the author considers a prerequisite to the estab-
lishment of legitimate authority generally. The concept of internaliza-
tion, as Vining uses it, implies the existence of an inside and an outside 
(pp. 179-84). Those who are inside are our "friends"; those left out 
are our "enemies" (pp. 21, 25, 59). True to form, this book clearly 
establishes an in-crowd and an out-crowd. The Supreme Court is In; 
the Interstate Commerce Commission is Out; courts in general are In; 
legislatures are Out; theology and literary criticism are In; sociological 
jurisprudence and law and economics are Out; and so on. In a subtle 
way the cliquishness of all this is part of its rhetorical appeal. 
Although Vining sweet-talks the reader with words of friendship, love, 
and commitment, implicit in his method, as in any splitting between 
ins and outs, is the danger of banishment and exile if one does not 
grant him the authoritativeness he claims. Vining shows scant com-
passion for his intellectual opponents. In one particularly unpleasant 
passage he gleefully tells three fables in which his enemies cause their 
own downfall. One of the characters is a Chicago School economist 
(Milton Friedman?) who retires to an "institution congenial to his 
principles." The economist is shunned and ignored by his new col-
leagues. "[W]hen finally, in some desolation, he complain[s] to an-
other member of the faculty that he ha[s] no friends, he [is] told, 'Why 
don't you go out and buy some' " (p. 118)? There is a meanness of 
spirit in this that detracts from the othenvise high moral tone of the 
book. 
II. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
Any account of legitimate authority is subject to attack on two 
grounds: that it is overinclusive, in that it would make some things 
authoritative that are not so; and that it is underinclusive, in that it 
would exclude some things that in fact are authoritative. Vining's the-
ory can be criticized on both grounds. 
His approach is overinclusive in that it fails to require that the 
authoritative be a command backed by some kind of threat. For Vin-
ing, a statement is authoritative if it is authentic and evokes an attitude 
of assent in the hearer. But any number of statements that we don't 
think of as authoritative would satisfy these criteria. I could authenti-
cally say, for example, that "the sun will rise tomorrow," and this may 
evoke the willing assent of the listener; but my statement is hardly 
authoritative. Even if we include the element of a command we have 
not narrowed the category sufficiently. I could say "come here!" to 
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somebody in a tone of command, and the person could willingly assent 
and come; but my statement would not qualify as authoritative if we 
both knew that there would be absolutely no consequences if the per-
son did not come. What is necessary is that my statement be a com-
mand backed by some kind of threat. More than this is required, for 
standing alone a command backed by threats is nothing but the au-
thoritarian. But it appears that some kind of threat is at least a neces-
sary, if not a sufficient, condition for the authoritative. 
Now Vining might respond that there are plenty of texts which we 
regard as authoritative that are not backed by threats. The Oxford 
English Dictionary may be the most authoritative popular dictionary 
of the English language, but surely it carries no threat if its definitions 
are violated. There are two answers to this. First, the word "authori-
tative" may be used in quite different senses as applied to a dictionary, 
on the one hand, and an exercise of political power, on the other. We 
might risk serious confusion if we equate the usages. Second, to the 
extent the usages are similar, it seems likely that there actually is some 
sort of threat or sanction lurking behind the dictionary example. 
When we say that the Oxford English Dictionary is "authoritative" we 
usually have in mind some kind of real or potential dispute about the 
meaning of a word. If the OED is truly authoritative, then one rejects 
its definitions at one's peril. 
A more troubling objection is that Vining's theory is underinclu-
sive. The most serious drawback is that the theory fails to account for 
how authority may be legitimate even when it is necessary to exert 
force against someone. Vining's theory rests ultimately on the hearer's 
assent. But what if the hearer does not assent? Surely it is still permis-
sible and legitimate for the state to force the hearer to obey in some 
cases. A complete theory of the authoritative should both justify the 
application of state coercion in some cases and provide a means for 
distinguishing when coercion is permissible and when it is not. Vin-
ing's assent-based approach does not easily support a theory that justi-
fies the application of force to an unwilling subject. 
A second sense in which the theory may be underinclusive con-
cerns its treatment of bureaucratic speech. Vining asserts that bureau-
cratic speech is not authoritative. But why not? Lawyers often treat 
the opinions of bureaucratic agencies with exactly the same techniques 
they apply to opinions of the Supreme Court. Elaborate bodies of pre-
cedent exist in many of these agencies, precedents which are cited by 
the parties and which appear to influence results. Vining's answer is 
that when lawyers cite the precedents of administrative agencies they 
are actually treating the text as strategic rather than authoritative (p. 
13). But don't lawyers treat Supreme Court texts as strategic also? 
Isn't treating texts strategically basic to the lawyer's craft in an adver-
sary system? The distinction between lawyers' treatment of agency 
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decisions and judicial opinions is not nearly as clear-cut as Vining 
would have it. 
Moreover, Vining surely overstates the claim that Supreme Court 
opinions represent an authentic statement of a guiding mind. Vining's 
Supreme Court is today a bureaucracy and always has been to some 
extent. In any multi-member court in which one judge writes for 
others there is necessarily going to be a fair amount of intentional am-
biguity, trading on points of doctrine, even out-and-out ghostwriting. 
All these forms of writing are inauthentic under Vining's system. 35 
Vining attempts to explain away these inconvenient features of the 
Supreme Court. He suggests that the Justices do not actually engage 
in negotiation and compromise on substantive points of doctrine, but 
rather exchange qualifications, drop connections between ideas, adopt 
different analytic approaches at different points in the opinion, and so 
on (p. 112). Moreover, says Vining, the Supreme Court is small and 
therefore supports the presupposition of mind more readily than does 
a sprawling bureaucracy (p. 113). These attempts to meet the objec-
tion are pallid and ineffectual. 
Even more troubling for Vining's theory is the legislature. Vining 
admits that legislatures display the classic indicia of inauthenticity. 
Statutes are drafted by bureaucratic staffs on Capitol Hill, by executive 
branch agencies, even by private lobbyists. Votes are traded as in a 
marketplace. Legislators act strategically or because they are in thrall 
to special interests. There is nothing of authenticity here. Yet every-
one agrees that statutes are authoritative. They even trump the 
Supreme Court except where the Constitution (itself a statutory enact-
ment) is involved. The fact that legislation is commonly perceived as 
authoritative suggests that political legitimacy may often be explained 
as a function of electoral accountability and majority rule. Yet Vining 
holds this traditional and widely accepted explanation to be an incom-
plete and flawed account of legitimate authority (e.g., p. 141). How, 
then, does Vining explain such a towering counter-example to his the-
ory as the existence of a legislative body emitting authoritative com-
mands? Amazingly, his answer is that we should fool ourselves into 
thinking the legislature is something that it is not, that we should in-
dulge in an illusion, a "sleight of hand" (p. 123). We are allowed, says 
Vining, to "play one trick upon ourselves, to have a thing which does 
not make sense introduced into our thinking as if it did make sense" 
(p. 123). This is an astounding response by a scholar to a gaping hole 
35. A strict application of Vining's principles would seem to call for seriatim opinions of the 
type, still popular in England, that existed in the Supreme Court before the institution of the 
opinion "of the Court" during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. The closest the Court comes to 
seriatim opinions today are those notorious cases where the Justices file seven or eight opinions 
agreeing with various sections and subsections of each other's opinions. But it is exactly such 
cases that have drawn the most fire as representing a diminution in the authoritativeness and 
value of the Court's work product. 
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in his theory. 36 
A final area in which Vining's theory may be underinclusive is its 
rejection of mendacious or deceptive speech. Certainly speech that is 
deliberately false and intended to deceive has few claims to being au-
thoritative. But there are any number of half-truths, nondisclosures, 
overlookings, white lies, diplomatic circumlocutions, and the like that 
seem to be necessities in government and in life. 37 Many of these are 
ordinarily thought of as authoritative. 
Government especially seems to be pervaded by these partial 
truths. The point can be illustrated by looking at Vining's Supreme 
Court. These days few would dispute that the explanations the Court 
gives in opinions are sometimes post hoc rationalizations rather than 
steps in an analytical trail leading from the facts to the judgment. Is 
the Court inauthentic because it presents justifications as explanations, 
or conclusions as reasons? Surely not. Few also would dispute that 
the Court willfully blinks at reality in many areas. In reviewing the 
constitutionality of state regulation of economic matters, for example, 
the Court regularly professes to believe the most incredible stories 
cooked up by state's attorneys to rationalize special interest legisla-
tion. 38 Either the Justices are remarkably dense or they are saying 
something that they do not really believe in these cases. Yet appar-
ently such exaggerated deference to state legislatures fills some impor-
tant function for a national court in a federal system of government. 
Finally, few would dispute that the Justices are well aware of the 
prejudices, predilections, and talents of the judges and courts whose 
opinions come before them for review. These subtle assessments 
surely influence the decisions in some cases. Yet the Court is re-
strained by the strictest rules of etiquette from admitting that such 
considerations have entered its thinking. 
In all these cases the Court is engaging in deception. But such 
deception does not appear to reduce the authority of the Court and 
may actually enhance it by contributing to the smooth functioning of a 
system of separation of powers and divided government. 
36. Vining's willingness to engage in this charade does not mean that he approves of legisla-
tion. He recommends that courts resist and undercut statutes that make fundamental changes in 
the body of the law. "Getting around legislated words is usually possible in the stream of life if 
our attitude toward them is cool enough and we see them as mute obstacles. But like getting 
around a post in a stream on a canoe trip, this takes time." P. 126. 
37. For a penetrating discussion of some of these forms of falsehoods, see S. BOK, supra note 
14. 
38. For examples, see Miller, Interstate Banking and the Court, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 179 
(discrimination against New York banks); Miller, A Judicial Footnote Cemented the New Deal, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1984, §1, at 28, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (discrimination against vegetable oil 
producers). For a powerful critique of the Court's leniency in this area, see R. EPSTEIN, TAK-
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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III. SELF-AUTHENTICATION 
Vining's theory of legitimate authority may therefore be incom-
plete in several significant respects. Nevertheless, it does capture 
something important and valuable. Vining is right that at least some 
speech that is deceptive, manipulative, and insincere is less authorita-
tive than speech that reflects what the speaker deeply believes. This 
appears to be true regardless of the content of the speech. Even if the 
speaker is saying something that would ordinarily command our as-
sent, we are much less likely to accept the statement as authoritative if 
we know that the speaker did not actually believe it. Vining's major 
contribution may be his emphasis on the importance of authenticity in 
the establishment of legitimate authority. 
The connection between the speaker and the spoken is an aspect of 
the broader phenomenon of self-authentication. Every time a person 
makes a statement, the question arises as to whether the statement is 
consistent with itself or with the life of the person who made it. If it is, 
then the statement is self-authenticating in some sense; if not it is 
self-refuting. There is a remarkable amount of interest in this issue of 
self-authentication, both at the level of theory and that of popular cul-
ture. The issue grips the imagination in a fashion that tends to sub-
stantiate Vining's emphasis on the importance of authenticity and 
authentication. 
Consider first instances of self-refutation. Texts may refute them-
selves. At issue is not the problem of internal inconsistency, as when 
an author asserts 'X" at one place and "not X" elsewhere. The sub-
ject here is paradox. , The Cretan who says that Cretans always lie and 
the barber who claims to shave everyone who does not shave himself 
both make statements that have a bizarre quality of self-refutation. If 
the Cretan tells the truth then he lies; if he lies then he tells the truth. 
If the barber shaves himself then he doesn't shave himself; if he doesn't 
shave himself then he does. These kinds of paradoxes occur most 
often in philosophical or religious speech. The early Wittgenstein, in 
attempting to show that the propositions of metaphysics were mean-
ingless, ended up proving that his own statements were equally mean-
ingless. 39 Religious statements become paradoxical when they 
describe a God that is asserted to be ineffable.40 The paradoxical qual-
ity is particularly acute in Buddhism because of its rejection of dual-
istic thinking. To say that dualistic statements are false is to self-refute 
because the statement itself is dualistic. Buddhist texts, particularly 
39. In the end the early Wittgenstein advised silence on the problems of metaphysics: 
"whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 3, at § 7. 
40. This difficulty is especially pronounced for statements of a primitive or fundamentalist 
variety. Sophisticated modern theologians are well aware of the problem of God's ineffability, 
and attempt to account for religious statements in a way that does not entail their being descrip· 
tions of God. The actual function of religious statements, however, then becomes a problem of 
considerable complexity. 
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those of the Mahayana school, tend to address this problem by deliber-
ately indulging in the wildest paradoxes. There is something eerie and 
fascinating about the underlying structure of these instances. 
Self-refutation also can occur when an author's own life or behav-
ior contradicts propositions that the author would have others believe. 
Sometimes an author asserts that the system he or she propounds is 
esoteric and can only be fully understood by those who qualify, either 
by virtue of their status at birth or through undergoing life experiences 
or rituals of initiation. Marx, for example, was of the opinion that a 
person's thoughts and beliefs were ineluctably determined by his or 
her class position.41 Yet Marx himself was a solid product of the 
bourgeoisie who by his own tenets should never have been able to 
come up with the theory he proposed. Freud stressed the powerful 
impulse to banish uncomfortable emotional material into the uncon-
scious and the equally powerful resistance to allowing that material to 
become conscious in the process of psychoanalysis.42 Yet Freud him-
self arrived at many of his theories through what he asserted was a 
successful self-analysis, something that would be virtually impossible 
according to the tenets of his own theory.43 
Often self-refutation takes a particularly spectacular turn when 
some individual is exposed doing exactly what he or she claims one 
should not do. In a recent case the author of a book on ethical philos-
ophy forged the signature of the Chairman of the Harvard University 
Department of Philosophy on a letter of recommendation to the pub-
lisher extolling the book's virtues.44 Every year in popular culture 
there are many such cases: the Swami who advocates sexual absti-
nence caught sleeping with his secretaries; the religious fundamentalist 
confessing an extramarital affair; the right-wing congressman admit-
ting to alcoholism and homosexuality; the advice columnist disclosing 
the breakup of her marriage; the health food advocate dying young; 
the faith healer afflicted by disease; the fitness expert struck down by a 
heart attack while jogging; and so on. The popular fascination with 
these events suggests that there is a powerful intuitive connection be-
tween a person's life and the content of what he or she is saying. 
There is a special poignancy to cases of self-refutation occurring 
long after a structure of legitimacy has been established. This is prob-
41. See K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (1938); K. MARX, A CONTRIBU-
TION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL EcONOMY (1859). 
42. See, e.g., 16 s. FREUD, THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 
286-302 (1963). 
43. Much of the interest in Freud's account of his self-analysis in The Interpretation of 
Dreams stems from this tension in his thinking. 
44. T. COONEY, TELLING RIGHT FROM WRONG (1985). The book was apparently quite 
well done and would have been accepted even without the recommendation. For a favorable 
review, see Hook, Would it Destroy the World?, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1985, § 7 (Book Review), 
at 13, col. 1. 
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ably part of the explanation for the public fascination with the Dead 
Sea Scrolls during the years following tl:ieir discovery. It was possible 
that the Scrolls contained some record of an early Christian commu-
nity, or at least some account of primitive Christianity different from 
that set forth in the gospels.45 A more recent exa,mple from the field of 
religion is the discovery of early Mormon documents that cast doubt 
on the authenticity of Joseph Smith's revelation.46 Or consider the 
case of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who after heeding his own injunction 
about silence for several years returned to the world of philosophy and 
refuted his own prior work with tremendous intellectual power.47 In 
all these cases the reality or threat of a belated self-refutation 
presented those working within the established tradition with the 
problem of how to maintain their system of beliefs and values in the 
face of the new evidence undercutting some apparently fundamental 
tenet of their faith. It is noteworthy that in ~Qp.e of these cases was it 
even conceivable that the self-refutation w~mld dissolve the existing 
institutional structures of belief a,nd value.4$ T.µe resiliency of institu-
tions to this kind of shock suggests that ov~r time institutions develop 
claims to legitimacy that become largely in9ep~n~ent of the authority 
of their founders. 
Interesting features are also found when we- examine cases of self-
authentication as opposed to self-refutation. 'There is, first, the phe-
nomenon of textual self-authentication e]l:plqred above in the specific 
context of Vining's book.49 There is also the s.~lf-authentication of a 
life lived in conformity with the author's stated philosophy. Plato un-
derstood the importance of the fact that Sg.crates drank the hemlock 
instead of escaping as he could so easily have done. 50 If Socrates had 
escaped, his philosophy would not have changed in any verbal sense. 
But it is clear that the power of his thoughts would have been dimin-
ished if he had failed to live up to his belief$ wh~n put to the ultimate 
test. 
Self-authentication is especially signific~t in religious contexts in 
which a prophet or sage claims to have received a message from God. 
45. See generally L. MOWRY, THE DEAD SEA SCRO~LS AND THJ;: EARLY CHURCH (1962). 
46. See Lindsey, The Mormons - Growth, Prosperity and <:;optroversy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 
1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 18. One of the letters reported that the Angel Moroni appeared to Smith 
in the form ofa white salamander, possibly indicating that the founder of Mormonism dabbled in 
magic before starting his career as a spiritual leader. ' · 
47. L. WIITGENSTEIN, supra note 5. . 
48. As one leading Mormon put it, the newly discovered letters "have no real relevancy to 
the question of the authenticity of the church or the divin.e origin of the Book of Mormon." 
Lindsey, supra note 46, at 42, col. 4. According to another ~ormon, even if honest scholarship 
proved that some Mormon doctrines were faulty, "the chuq:~ could adjust to it and perhaps even 
be strengthened by it." Id. at 46, col. 2. 
49. See Part I.C supra. 
50. See PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 27 (E. l;lamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961) 
(Crito). 
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Many of the supernatural trappings of religion are intended specifi-
cally for the purpose of authenticating the leader's claim. Here we see 
such phenomena as miraculous births; astounding displays of early in-
tellectual or spiritual prowess; performances of healing miracles and 
other demonstrations of supernatural power; and amazing incidents 
surrounding the leader's death, such as incorruptibility or resurrec-
tion. Martyrdom has a special significance in religious self-authentica-
tion as well, for it is th,e ultimate sign of faith on the part of the 
believer. For primitive Chiistianity the martyrdom of Jesus presented 
both a problem of self-refutation and the potential for self-authentica-
tion. How could the Son of God be delivered into the hands of man 
and killed? Some of the core institutions of Christian theology - the 
Resurrection and the tenet that Christ died for the sins of humankind 
- trace directly to this problem of self-reference. 
The beliefs and events described immediately above differ from 
each other in any miniber of respects. They do, however, seem to 
point to the special importance of the relationship between author and 
text. Professor Vining's book brings that relationship into the fore-
front. The book is sweeping, ambitious, original, and unflaggingly in-
teresting. It proposes a new and worthwhile approach to the problem 
of political authority ....:.... one that is not free of problems, but that nev-
ertheless merits careful consideration by those interested in pondering 
the difficult and perplexing question of the relationship between texts 
that are authoritative and legitimate and those that are merely 
authoritarian. 
